Contact Project Developer Ashish D. Tiwari [astiwz@gmail.com]
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Identity-Based Proxy-Oriented Data Uploading and Remote Data Integrity Checking in Public Cloud.

Identity-Based Proxy-Oriented Data Uploading and Remote Data Integrity Checking in Public Cloud.
Abstract-Synopsis-Documentation

Identity-Based Proxy-Oriented Data Uploading and Remote Data Integrity Checking in Public Cloud.

ABSTRACT

More and more clients would like to store their data to PCS (public cloud servers) along with the rapid development of cloud computing. New security problems have to be solved in order to help more clients process their data in public cloud. When the client is restricted to access PCS, he will delegate its proxy to process his data and upload them. On the other hand, remote data integrity checking is also an important security problem in public cloud storage. It makes the clients check whether their outsourced data is kept intact without downloading the whole data. From the security problems, we propose a novel proxy-oriented data uploading and remote data integrity checking model in identity-based public key cryptography: IDPUIC (identity-based proxy-oriented data uploading and remote data integrity checking in public cloud). We give the formal definition, system model and security model. Then, a concrete ID-PUIC protocol is designed by using the bilinear pairings. The proposed ID-PUIC protocol is provably secure based on the hardness of CDH (computational Diffie-Hellman) problem. Our ID-PUIC protocol is also efficient and flexible. Based on the original client’s authorization, the proposed ID-PUIC protocol can realize private remote data integrity checking, delegated remote data integrity checking and public remote data integrity checking.

SYSTEM ANALYSIS

EXISTING SYSTEM

checker must have R1,Ro,Rp. Ro,Rp are the part of original client’s private key and the proxy’s private key respectively. Their publicity cannot leak their the other part of private key, i.e., σo, σp cannot be leaked. The private key extraction phase Extract is actually a modified ElGamal signature scheme which is existentially unforgeable. For the identity ID, the extracted private key (R, σ) is a signature of ID. Since ElGamal signature is existentially unforgeable, the private key part σ will keep secret even if R is made public. On the other hand, R1 is generated by the original client in order to create the signature on the warrant m!. Thus, R1 is also known to the original client

PROPOSED SYSTEM


 proof process is almost the same as Shacham- Waters’s protocol [20], we only give the differences. In Shacham-Waters’s protocol, u is randomly picked from G1. In our ID-PUIC protocol, u is calculated by using the hash function h. In the random oracle model, h’s output value is indistinguishable from a random value nn the group G1. In the phase TagGen, the proxy-key σ is used in ID-PUIC protocol while the data owner’s secret key a is used in Shacham- Waters’s protocol [20]. For PCS, σ and a has the same function to generate the block tags. When PCS is dishonest, since Shacham-Waters’s protocol is existentially unforgeable in random oracle model, our proposed ID-PUIC protocol is also existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model. The detailed proof process is omitted since it is very similar to Shacham-Waters’s protocol.


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